A terrorist group, based in a developing (host) country, draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to conduct attacks at home and abroad. The host nation chooses proactive countermeasures, while accounting for the terrorist campaign. Moreover, a targeted developed nation decides its optimal mix of immigration quotas and defensive counterterrorism actions. Even though proactive measures in the host country may not curb terrorism at home, it may still be advantageous in terms of national income. Increases in the unskilled immigration quota augment terrorism against the developed country; increases in the skilled immigration quota may or may not raise terrorism against the developed country. When the developed country assumes a leadership role, it strategically augments its terrorism defenses and reduces its unskilled immigration quota to induce more proactive measures in the host country. The influence of leadership on the skilled immigration quota is more nuanced.
Introduction
Ever since the unprecedented terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (henceforth 9/11), economists have focused on myriad aspects of terrorism including its impact on growth (Blomberg et al. 2004; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2008 ), development (Keefer and Loayza 2008 , stock markets (Chen and Siems 2004) , and counterterrorism policy (Bandyopadhyay and Sandler 2011) . Economists and political scientists applied game-theoretic tools to investigate the practice of counterterrorism against both homegrown domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism (see, e.g., Arce and Sandler 2005; Bapat 2006 Bapat , 2011 Landes 1978; Sandler et al. 1983 ). Some contributions investigated the demand side in terms of the number and location of terrorist incidents (e.g., Sandler and Siqueira 2006; Siqueira and Sandler 2007) , while other studies examined the supply side in terms of the roots of terrorism (e.g., Abadie 2006; Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Piazza 2006 Piazza , 2011 . Krueger and Laitin (2008) investigated both sides of terrorism by analyzing what determines whether a nation is a source or a target of transnational terrorism (see, also, Blomberg et al. 2009 ). Another strand of the terrorism literature relates to international trade and foreign direct investment (e.g., Bandyopadhyay et al. 2011a; Enders and Sandler 1996; Nitsch and Schumacher 2004) . The findings and methodology of this literature are nicely summarized by Mirza and Verdier (2008) . In general, terrorism can curb trade and capital flows owing to heightened costs and risks.
Despite these contributions, there is no paper that formally connects immigration policy to the supply of terrorism in a game-theoretic general equilibrium context. This is an important omission because an exclusive focus on the standard terms-of-trade effects of immigration policy may result in misleading policy recommendations. 1 The purpose of this paper is to fill this void by integrating immigration and counterterrorism policies in a strategic general equilibrium framework. We show that terrorism-related costs and/or benefits, along with terms-of-trade effects, are required when determining an optimal immigration policy. There is a small emerging empirical literature that comes to vastly divergent conclusions about the relationship between immigration and transnational terrorism. In particular, studies that focused on known transnational terrorists showed that many were immigrants (e.g., Leiken and Brooke 2006) , while a study that looked at immigrants in general did not find a significant relationship between immigration and terrorism (Dreher and Gassebner 2010) . Based on the World Values Survey on attitudes, Fischer (2011) found that immigrants are more likely than natives to support the application of terrorism. These mixed empirical results indicate that a theoretical analysis of the relationship between terrorism and immigration quotas imposed on the potential source country for terrorists may enlighten not only policymakers, but also empirical researchers. This is especially true in our theoretical framework, which has counterterrorism measures as choice variables in the target and source countries.
In our theoretical framework, a transnational terrorist organization, based in a developing country, draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to attack targets at home and abroad. These two types of laborers join the terrorist group when their anticipated gain exceeds that in the productive sector; this decision is influenced by wages and counterterrorisminduced risks of failure. The ideal factor proportions differ between attacks at home and abroad.
Hitting targets abroad in a developed country, such as the United States or France, requires a greater proportion of skilled to unskilled labor, compared with hitting targets at home. This follows because attacks abroad require more complex logistics, language skills, reduced infrastructure, and traversing borders. Given that attacks abroad are more skill-intensive than home attacks, we analyze the effects of counterterrorism policy as well as immigration policy on the supply of terrorism and on the national income of the two countries. The source country applies proactive measures to annihilate the resident terrorists, while the targeted developed country relies on defensive measures to deflect attacks abroad. As such, there are elements of positive and negative international externalities. Our theoretical construct is descriptive of transnational terrorism in the post-Cold War era during which terrorist groups -e.g., al-Qaida, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jemaah Islamiyah -take refuge in developing countries (e.g., Pakistan, Yemen, and Indonesia), while attacking host and developed countries' interests at home and abroad.
Given the diverse types of agents in our model (i.e., terrorist recruits, terrorist group, source country, and developed country) and the alternative policy instruments, the tradeoffs are subtle and complex. Among other results, we find that the developed country's defensive efforts deflect attacks back to the source country. Proactive measures against the terrorists in the source or host country may or may not reduce attacks abroad depending on a critical unskilled to skilled labor threshold. When this threshold is high, the terrorist group reduces unskill-intensive terrorism rapidly at home in response to proactive measures, thereby shifting more of its resources to attacks abroad. The opposite is true when this threshold is relatively small. Larger unskilled immigration quotas raise terrorism in the developed country as terrorism is reduced in the source country as unskilled workers emigrate. An increase in skilled immigration quotas need not raise terrorism in the developed country despite skill-intensive terrorism on its soil owing to opposing forces. Even when a proactive campaign in the source country results in more terrorism, it may be advantageous as the productive sector recaptures more labor, thereby raising income. The developed country may gain from assuming a leadership role in choosing its defensive measures and immigration quotas by inducing more proactive countermeasures in the source country. Such measures safeguard the developed country -a positive externality.
The remainder of the paper contains four sections. Section 2 displays the problem of the terrorist group and its volunteers as they respond to the two countries' policy choices. In Section 3, the source or foreign country's proactive choice is analyzed. This is followed in Section 4 by an analysis of the defensive and immigration choices in the developed (home) country under two scenarios: (i) simultaneous policy choices in the two countries, and (ii) a leadership role for the developed country. Concluding remarks are contained in Section 5.
The terrorist organization
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups in order to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims (Enders and Sandler 2011) . Terrorism is transnational when an incident in one country involves perpetrators, victims, institutions, governments, or citizens of another country -e.g., 9/11 skyjackings. In recent years, transnational terrorist groups often locate their base in a developing country from which they can attack Western interests at home or abroad. Thus, Yemen, Lebanon, Somalia, Syria, Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria, Afghanistan, and other developing countries have been the base for many notorious terrorist groups (Hoffman 2006; Mickolus 2008 ).
The underlying game has two to three stages. In the first variant, the two governments choose their counterterrorism and immigration policies in the first stage, and the terrorist group decides its terrorist campaign in the second stage. In the second variant, the developed country decides its counterterrorism and immigration policies in the first stage, followed by the developing country picking its proactive countermeasures in the second stage. Finally, the terrorist group allocates its attacks at home and abroad in the third stage. We solve both games backwards beginning with terrorist group's decision in the final stage.
The terrorist organization derives benefit from attacking targets in both the host developing nation (say, F) and the developed nation (say, H). Along the lines of Mirza and Verdier (2008) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011b) , the terrorist group's utility function is 
Terrorist attacks targeted in a developed nation from foreign bases require a higher degree of sophistication and are produced using a more skill-intensive technology. However, both types of terrorism require a mix of unskilled and skilled labor and exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS). The terrorism production functions in H and F are: 
where  and  are unskilled and skilled immigrant pools, respectively, in the developed nation.
The partials of A are non-negative because the presence of more skilled or unskilled immigrants potentially improves the delivery capability for terrorism in H. Using Eqs. (1)- (5), we express the terrorist group's expected utility as:
Let the unskilled (skilled) labor supply be inelastically given for F at The distribution of such beliefs is given by the following probability density and cumulative distribution functions, respectively:
All unskilled labor units in F earn uF w from the productive sector, which equals the marginal product of unskilled labor in producing goods. When they volunteer for the terrorist organization, they know that there is a chance that they may not be able to serve effectively. For example, they may be killed or incarcerated before being able to take part in an attack. They are assumed to succeed in providing their services to the terrorist organization with a probability  , which is a declining function of proactive effort m undertaken by the host government.
Assuming diminishing returns in the use of such offensive action, we have
An unskilled labor unit stays in the productive sector if its wage exceeds it expected marginal return from being a terrorist:
Eq. (9) describes a margin that is similar to ones used in models of equilibrium migration, where a migrant equates the expected return from migrating to that of the status quo.
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Consider the decision faced by an illegal immigrant (e.g., Ethier 1986 ). If, say, someone stays home in Mexico, s/he earns a Mexican wage with certainty. When, however, s/he attempts to migrate illegally to the United States, s/he may be caught and returned home after some penalties are imposed; or s/he may cross successfully and earn a higher wage. The higher the probability of detection at the border and the greater the penalty, the less likely is the individual to migrate.
The analogy here is that higher proactive effort reduces the anticipated probability of success for a laborer contemplating a move to the terrorist sector. The associated deterrence effect of proaction provides a more favorable allocation of labor for the productive sector, thereby bolstering national income. Thus, the margin, described in (9), is critical and endogenous to policy choices.
Based on Eq. (7) and (9), the fraction of unskilled labor force that stays in the productive sector is
of which a fraction  succeeds in providing their services in terrorist attacks. Thus, the unskilled labor pool
Similarly, let
g  , and   s G  , be the radicalization parameter, the probability density function, and the cumulative distribution function for skilled labor, respectively. Therefore, the skilled-labor pool for the terrorist organization is
The terrorist organization maximizes its utility [Eq. (6)], given its supply of skilled and unskilled labor [Eqs. (10) and (11)]. The constrained optimization problem for the terrorist organization is
where L  and S  are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the unskilled and skilled labor constraints, respectively. The first-order conditions (FOCs) yield the unskilled and skilled labor used by the terrorist organization in attacks at home and abroad and also the shadow prices (i.e.,
the optimal values of L  and S  ) of these resources for the terrorist organization. Denoting the vector of parameters faced by the terrorist organization by  , we have
Substituting (13) into (12), we have the envelope function
Using the envelope theorem, we obtain the supply of terrorism aimed at H's and F's interests:
It is easy to show that * V is convex and homogeneous of degree one in H  and .
Proposition 1: A rise in H's counterterrorism defense effort ( e ) reduces terrorism against it while raising the terrorism directed at F.
Proof
Based on the FOCs of the optimization problem, it is easy to show that
6 * V is similar to the revenue function used in dual models of trade (see Dixit and Norman 1980 
Eq. (18a) implies that
Eqs. (17) and (18b) establish the proposition. ■ Proposition 1 confirms the terrorism reduction versus terrorism deflection consequence of defensive measures that dates back to Lapan and Sandler (1988) (see also Bandyopadhyay and Sandler 2011; Bier et al. 2007; Intriligator 2010; Sandler and Siqueira 2006) . This proposition shows that a general equilibrium framework preserves this result. H's defensive actions reduce the likelihood of successful terrorist incidents in H, thereby deflecting them back to the source country F. Although H's homeland is now safer for its actions, its interest can still be hit abroad -e.g., attacks against US people or property in Pakistan. Thus, country H must weigh these losses against the gains from reduced attacks on its homeland when coming up with an optimal defense policy (see Section 4). Homeland attacks are typically more damaging than foreign attacks on its interests. Recent empirical studies showed a marked shift in terrorist attacks from developed to developing countries following 9/11-motivated security increases Sandler 2006, 2011) . Developed countries' interests were more frequently targeted abroad.
We now turn our attention to the effects of proactive policies in the country hosting the terrorists. The effect of a rise in proactive measures m on
Using the envelope property of * V and (12), we obtain
Differentiating (10) and (11), respectively, yields
Eq. (21) shows that proactive effort must reduce both the unskilled and the skilled labor resources of the terrorist group for two reasons. First, a rise in proactive effort depletes the group's labor resources for a given labor allocation between the productive and terrorist sectors.
Second, as proaction rises, the ex ante return from joining the terrorist organization must fall [Eq.
(9) above], so that fewer laborers become terrorists. This effect complements the direct effect of proaction, leading to fewer terrorists.
Substituting (21) into (20) and differentiating (20), we obtain
In the Appendix, we show that 
Using (19)- (23), we show in the Appendix that
Analogously, we can show that 
Cases 1 through 3 establish the proposition. ■ From (21), we know that a rise in proactive effort reduces both the skilled and unskilled labor resources of the terrorist group; however, this does not imply that terrorism must fall in both nations. To explain why, we focus on Case 1. Eq. (24) In Case 3, as unskilled labor resources decline, the terrorist group scales back 
The proof is in the Appendix. ■ A greater target preference for H makes the terrorists devote more of their resources to attacking H, which leaves fewer resources for attacks on F. Thus, when terrorists fixate on H, 
The foreign (source) government
In stage 2, F's government decides its proactive measures against the resident terrorist group.
We assume that F produces a single good, F Q , using the following CRS production function:
where F L and F S are unskilled and skilled labor used in the production of this good. Recalling that X is the share of unskilled labor engaged in productive activity in F, we have
and, similarly, 8 We assume that emigration is neutral in terms of affecting the probability distributions of radicalization in F's population of skilled and unskilled labor. Thus a reduction of the unskilled (skilled) labor pool through emigration does not affect the fraction X (G).
F's national income, including the earnings of its emigrants and net of terrorism damage, T F , and counterterrorism spending, is
where uH w and sH w are the unskilled and skilled wage rates, respectively, in H. In (28), the price of proactive measures is normalized to be 1.
We assume that H's CRS production function is:
Accounting for the immigrants in H's labor pool, we obtain
The wage rates in the two nations reflect their respective marginal products. Suppressing the factor endowments in the functional forms, we have:
Eq. (31) reflects that homogeneity of degree one of the production functions in both nations makes the marginal products and, hence, the factor returns determined entirely by the unskilled labor intensity   When, however, proaction reduces the availability of skilled and unskilled labor in the same proportion, their relative abundance in F is unchanged, so that F's wages are unaffected. This issue is addressed below.
Country F takes H's immigration quotas ( and  ) as given when choosing its nationalincome-maximizing proactive effort. In light of (31), this fixes H i and, hence, the skilled and unskilled wages in H in terms of F's decision making. Differentiating (28), we obtain the FOC for F's income-maximizing proactive effort:
Eq. (32a) implicitly defines F's Nash reaction function as
Differentiating the distribution function X yields:
In the Appendix, we show that (9)- (11)]. Thus, the proportions of skilled and unskilled labor (i.e., G and X , respectively) that join the productive sector must both rise. If X  exceeds G  , the proportion X rises faster than the proportion G . In the light of (31) this suggests that Consequently, wages in F do not change. For simplicity, we henceforth assume that the probability density functions x and g are independently, identically, and uniformly distributed with supports zero and  , such that
Using ( 
Similarly, we get:
Proposition 4: Nation F chooses its proactive response to reduce its terrorism damages and also to benefit from bringing more of its resources from the terrorist sector into the productive sector.
Even when proactive efforts raise terrorism in F, the government may still choose to employ it.
Proof
Using (31), we can write (32a) as
The proposition is established from (38) in light of (37a), (37b), and Proposition 2. ■ A positive X m   in (37a) reflects the rise in the proportion of productive unskilled labor in F as greater proactive measures dissuade some potential terrorist volunteers. The ensuing rise in output in F is captured by the first term of (38). Similarly, the second term in (38) reflects the corresponding rise in output from the return of skilled labor to productive activities. Based on Proposition 2, proactive effort may, however, increase F T . Even then, national income may increase as long as the first two terms in (38) dominate (starting from 0 m  ). This is a general equilibrium result, novel to this literature. This finding indicates that the deterrence effect, which keeps more of the population away from terrorism, may be an important determinant of national-income-maximizing counterterrorism policy. It can rationalize the apparently counterintuitive behavior of governments that continue to engage in proactive counterterrorism policies, despite a rise in terrorist attacks due to such policies. Such attacks are known as backlash stemming from counterterrorism-induced grievances (Bloom 2005; Rosendorff and Sandler 2004; Siqueira and Sandler 2007) .
The developed country's government policy choices
Based on (29) 
where the price of defensive effort is normalized at 1. Using (2) and (5), we have 
Nash equilibrium
We have already described the policy choice rule for F where it assumes H's policies to be given when choosing its income-maximizing proactive level. Under the Nash assumption, H takes m as given while choosing its income-maximizing policy variables. The resulting equilibrium is a Nash policy equilibrium. Using (31), we can differentiate (39b) to obtain H's FOCs for defense and immigration quota choices as: 
This fall in unskilled wage benefits (hurts) H depending on whether
. This is best understood by first considering the case where there are no skilled immigrants in H (i.e., 0   ). In this case, the first term on the right-hand side of (40b) equals 0
. This is simply the gain in H's national income from having to pay less to the inframarginal units of unskilled immigrants when the marginal immigrant reduces the wages for the existing unskilled laborers. Now, consider the presence of an existing pool of skilled immigrants (i.e., 0   ). The fall in the unskilled wage due to unskilled immigration drives up the skilled wage . ., 0
Thus, more has to be paid to the skilled immigrant pool -i.e., T .
We know from Proposition 3 that the factor allocation effects lead to a fall in the unskillintensive F T . In addition, the wage changes discussed above also draws more skilled labor into terrorism. This tends to reduce F T , which benefits H if it has extensive foreign interests. Eq.
(40b) suggests that in the presence of terrorism, the term-of-trade effects as well as the terrorismrelated costs (or benefits) must be appropriately evaluated to design unskilled immigration policy. The general equilibrium analysis highlights that there is a complex interplay of margins.
Finally, we turn to an analysis of the skilled immigration quota on H's income. In light of the preceding discussion, it is easy to see that a rise in the skilled immigration quota reduces sH w and raises uH w . However, unlike the case discussed above, if /   exceeds H i , then H's national income falls due to the terms-of-trade effect. This follows because H loses more from paying higher wages to unskilled immigrants than it gains from reduced payments to the relatively small group of skilled immigrants.
We know from Proposition 3 that a rise in  may or may not reduce *H
T because of opposing terrorism-facilitation and resource-reallocation effects. An additional effect not contained in Proposition 3 is at work here. The unskilled labor intensity 
Stackelberg equilibrium
This subsection describes the Stackelberg equilibrium in which H chooses its policy one stage ahead of F, so that the underlying game has three stages. To compare the Stackelberg equilibrium with the Nash equilibrium, we need the slope of F's Nash policy reaction function at the Nash equilibrium. Analysis of this slope is intractable for the general formulation.
Therefore, we analyze the special case of   
Proof:
We show in the Appendix that:
12 The range 0 tF tH l l l   corresponds to Case 3 in Proposition 2. If 0 l lies outside this range, one of the two types of terrorism must be scaled up. As we explain below, the strategic complementarity of defense and proactive measures depends on how factor intensities change due to defense, and also on how proaction affects the level of terrorism. When both types of terrorism are reduced by proaction, these two effects complement each other. When proaction raises one kind of terrorism, while reducing the other, we have opposing effects and the pattern of strategic complementarity (or substitutability) is not clear.
where Z is the sum of the first two terms in (38), and
Consider the effect of defense on the net marginal benefit of F's proactive response, where the latter is defined in (38). For given m and immigration quotas ( and  ), Eq. (31) indicates that skill intensities and skilled and unskilled wages in both nations are fixed. Thus, the first two terms in (38) To analyze the Stackelberg equilibrium, we write (39b) as
Using (32b), we can rewrite (41a) to represent the payoff of H from being a Stackelberg leader, If we evaluate the marginal leadership payoffs at the Nash equilibrium, then the first term on the right-hand side of (42a) through (42c) , respectively, is zero. Using the Lemma above, we have 0
In 
. This suggests that e should be raised and  should be reduced at the Nash equilibrium to raise the Stackelberg payoff towards its maximum.
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Using the Lemma, we know that 0
In turn, this suggests that the leadership skilled immigration quota must be lower than the Nash level if
We have to assume here that the cross effect of  on the marginal benefit of defense and vice versa does not outweigh the first-order effects we highlight here. against H both at home and in F. These benefits prompt H to behave strategically by raising its defensive measures to spur F's proactive efforts. The argument for reducing the unskilled immigration quota at the Stackelberg equilibrium is similar, since it raises terrorism in F. The skilled immigration quota will be raised or lowered depending on whether  raises or reduces proaction, respectively. The condition that is critical in determining the direction of change of the skilled immigration quota is outlined in Proposition 6.
Concluding remarks
Immigration and counterterrorism policies are both central concerns confronting the United States and many other targeted developed countries. Moreover, consistent with our model, numerous transnational terrorist groups have taken up residency in developing countries with limited capabilities to root out the groups. This paper is the first game-theoretic general equilibrium analysis that investigates the interrelationship between immigration quotas and the choice between defensive countermeasures in the developed country and proactive measures in the (source) developing country.
Even though the analysis is complex and ambiguous in places, there are many important and unambiguous insights. First, developed countries gain from deflecting attacks back to the source country despite their own interests in the latter. Second, proactive measures against a resident terrorist group need not reduce terrorism at home and abroad. This is a novel result that hinges on labor-intensity considerations in the productive and terrorist sectors at home and abroad. In contrast, the literature views such proactive measures as necessarily reducing terrorism everywhere (e.g., Sandler and Siqueira 2006) . Third, the source country for terrorism may be better off in augmenting proactive measures even if this leads to more attacks at home. This is the case when such measures more than compensate for the additional terrorism by augmenting the labor supply in the productive sector so that national income rises. Fourth, given that terrorist attacks are skill-intensive in the developed country, we show that the developed country can reduce its terrorism at home by limiting quotas on unskilled labor. This follows because the source country must then contend with a larger pool of terrorists at home. A reduction in the skilled immigration quota may not curb terrorism in the developed country despite terrorism being skill-intensive there. From a war-on-terror viewpoint, our findings support the tendency for developed countries to encourage skilled labor migration and discourage unskilled labor migration. This follows even though terrorism is skill-intensive in the developed country. Fifth, we identify the circumstances where the developed country can gain a strategic advantage through policy leadership. In this case, greater defensive countermeasures combined with reduced unskilled immigration quotas shift the burden of the war on terror to the source country. Sixth, we establish that optimal immigration or counterterrorism policies cannot be examined in isolation; thus, there are firm theoretical grounds for including US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Department of Homeland Security. That is, the margins affecting immigration choices can be greatly influenced by counterterrorism policies at home and abroad.
There are many fruitful directions for extension. For example, Cases 1 and 2 of Proposition 2 can be investigated in the leader-follower framework. Foreign aid can be introduced as a choice variable to bolster the developing country's proactive efforts in their follower role. Additional countries can be added to the analysis. 
Derivation of Eq. (34):
Given (31) and the implicit function theorem, we have and simplifying, we get (34).
Derivations supporting the Lemma:
We assume that   We can also show that 0 
7. Deriving H's policy rules [Eqs. (40a) 
through (40c)}:
(a) Derivation of Eq. (40a):
